Enhancing Trust in Trust Services: Towards an Intelligent Human-input-based Blockchain Oracle (IHiBO) by Yu, Liuwen et al.
Enhancing Trust in Trust Services: Towards an














As their name suggests, trust is of crucial
importance in “trust service”. Nevertheless, in many
cases, these services suffer from a lack transparency,
documentation, traceability, and inclusive multi-lateral
decision-making mechanisms. To overcome these
challenges, in this paper we propose an integrated
framework which incorporates formal argumentation
and negotiation within a blockchain environment
to make the decision-making processes of fund
management transparent and traceable. We introduce
three possible architectures and we evaluate and
compare them considering different technical, financial,
and legal aspects.
1. Introduction
It is a commonplace that trust has a special
importance in entering into contractual relations. There
is a domain in which the importance of trust is so
crucial that the whole type of service is named after
it, i.e. trust services, where the fund managers are
in the position of a fiduciary acting on behalf of the
principals. The whole service the fiduciary provides
is subject to the overall duty to act in the best interest
of the client. The legislator can (and does1) declare
the principal’s right to check the fiduciary’s relevant
activities in order to give some weight to this duty by
its intended controlability. On one hand, though, most
probably there is a difference between the principal’s
and the fund managers’ expertise and overview giving
∗This work has received funding from the EU H2020 research
and innovation programme under the MSCA ITN European Joint
Doctorate grant agreement No 814177 LAST-JD-RIoE.
1For instance, the 6:315. § of the Hungarian Civil Code (Act V of
2013) says: The principal and the beneficiary shall have the right to
check the fiduciary’s activities relating to asset management.
the very reason to enter in such a relationship, and on
the other hand, the lack of the decision making processes
being documented might limit the transparency one can
gain by practicing this right.
While trust companies might rely on smart contracts
when engaging in their core activities in the securities
market—as suggested by scholars [1, 2] and proven
by the surge of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) [3]—the
involvement of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs)
for the securities transactions does not address the
possible trust issues between the principal and the
fiduciary: the former does not have access to the reason
why the transaction took place and whether it was really
in his interest. To this regard, trust can be understood
as a relational attribute between a social actor and
other actor and/or institutions, as in [4], but also as a
technique for dealing with uncertainty about the actions
and communications of other parties, as in [5].
Since the process to make decisions from incomplete
and inconsistent information—both in general and in
the fund management use case—is a complicated
process which may involve different parties with their
own interests, we argue that a reasoning system can
be combined with DLTs, for making these decisions
featured with auditability, transparency, traceability and
explainability. In this paper, we address such a gap
taking into consideration several aspects influencing
such a situation. Regarding the fund managers’
decision-making process about investing the principal’s
money, we argue that formal argumentation can help
explain why a claim or a decision is made. In fact,
argumentation and trust share a common function: they
both deal with change and uncertainty in complex social
environment [6]. Then, for enabling conflict-resolution
between parties, negotiation can be used to determine
the quantities, investment timing or other activities.
Information incorporating the different fund managers’
opinions is provided by: argumentation, e.g. to decide





whether to buy, sell or hold securities, and negotiation,
e.g. to determine the quantities and investment timing.
The second set of aspects we take in account
consists of the implication of the use of oracles
and smart contracts, the verifyability and costs of
the used technologies, and the extent and limits
of the transparency to gain. Integrating formal
argumentation and multi-agent negotiation for creating
the proper external input triggering the transaction’s
smart contract leads us to framework we call Intelligent
Human-input-based Blockchain Oracle (IHiBO).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we provide the motivation and a use case for
our work, while in Section 3 the background concepts.
Section 4 has the purpose of providing an overview of
formal argumentation and negotiation, while in Section
5 we specify the possible architectures needed for our
solution. Discussions and conclusions are provided in
Section 6.
2. Motivation
In this section, we describe the ecosystem that we
intend to take as an example as a use case for the entire
remainder of the paper, namely portfolio management
(for the securities market), and delve into the roles
of the parties and their relationship, especially that of
the fund manager(s) and the fund management process.
Fund managers play an important role in the investment
and financial world, as they provide investors with the
peace of mind that their money is in the hands of an
expert [7]. However, reality is not always as hoped and
investors tend to know but do not actually know where
their money is going, why, and how much is the true
profit. A possible simplified process of fund investment
management includes the following activities, as Figure
1 shows.
In portfolio management, the core duties of fund
managers under AIFMD2 and UCITSD3 is to perform
portfolio and risk management on behalf of their
investors The process of portfolio management on the
manager side is formally defined as follows [8]: a
dynamic decision process, whereby a business’s list
of active new product (and development) projects is
constantly up-dated and revised. In this process, new
projects are evaluated, selected and prioritized; existing
projects may be accelerated, killed or de-prioritized;
2Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
(AIFMD.http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/61/oj)
3Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings
for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/65/oj
Figure 1. Fund Investment Process
and resources are allocated and re-allocated to
active projects. The portfolio decision process is
characterized by uncertain and changing information,
dynamic opportunities, multiple goals and strategic
considerations, interdependence among projects, and
multiple decision-makers and locations.
The fund can be managed by one person, by two
people as co-managers, or by a team of three or
more people. Fund managers primarily research and
determine the best stocks, bonds, or other securities to
fit the strategy of the fund, then buy and sell them. Since
the fund managers are responsible for the success of the
fund, they must also research companies, and study the
financial industry and the economy. Keeping up to date
on trends in the industry helps the fund managers make
key decisions that are consistent with the fund’s goals.
Typically, analysts assist fund managers with individual
research on investment ideas and subsequent buy, sell,
or hold opinions (or several managers work together).
The main feature of investing in a fund is entrusting
investment management decisions to the professionals
who maintain it.
3. Blockchain and Financial Agreements
In this section, we outline the potential of DLTs
to revolutionize financial agreements and a particular
instance of how fund managers trade securities on
behalf of their clients on blockchain platform. We
firstly introduce the backgound of DLTs, blockchain,
smart contracts and oracles which are indispensable
components in the paradigm of the decentralized
financial market infrastructures and also in our
following sections where we propose the framework for
developing fund management. The overall discussion of
blockchain-based securities market is out of the scope of
this work.
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3.1. Blockchain, Smart contracts and Oracles
The blockchain is part of the realm of Distributed
Ledger Technologies (DLTs) which consists of a
network of nodes that maintain a ledger by following
the same protocol. In the case of the blockchain,
the ledger is organized into chronologically ordered
blocks where each block is sequentially linked to the
previous one [9]. When the majority of network
nodes execute the exact same protocol, such as in the
Bitcoin network [9], the blockchain is cryptographically
guaranteed to be tamper-proof and unforgeable, and this
allows to create a trust mechanisms for multiple users
in a distributed environment, without the need for third
party intermediaries [4].
A feature that some DLTs enable is the possibility
to execute smart contracts, firstly introduced by the
Ethereum blockchain [10]. Smart contracts consist of
instructions that, once deployed on the ledger, cannot
be altered and thus allowing the outcome of their
execution to be always the same for anyone who runs
it (i.e. the DLT network nodes). This enable the
realization of a wide range of applications far beyond
cryptocurrency transactions [11, 12, 13]. Usually, the
possible instructions of a smart contract are embedded
in the DLT protocol and their execution can only involve
data coming from other smart contracts or from the
user’s inputs, e.g. smart contracts cannot fetch a
webpage on the Internet. This “closure” ensures the
execution of smart contracts to be more resistant to
attacks with higher degree of certainty, thus making the
whole system more secure [12]. This obviously limits
the possibility usage of these technologies, since the
vast majority of the possible smart contract applications
would require real time information from the network
external world.
In order for smart contracts to operate in the real
world, data must flow in both directions and thus the
high demand of applications gave birth to blockcahin
oracles. These third-party systems act as a bridge that
connects the DLT network and the “outside” world,
providing the ability to retrieve, verify and digest the
data into smart contracts. Oracles can be implemented
as [14]: (i) software, that interact with the information
needed from online sources; (ii) hardware, retrieve
data from physical world directly through scanners
sensors; (iii) human, interacting with individuals. In
all cases their off-chain execution is either centralized,
i.e. coming from a single source, or decentralized,
consensus-based multitude of sources.
3.2. Decentralized Financial Market
Infrastructures
Often, when talking about financial markets, one
immediately visualizes a centrally organized institution
being part of a monolithic paradigm that has been
established over the years. It is therefore difficult to
deviate from a logic so rooted in the social structure
as the market centralization. The advent of DLT,
however, seems to be able to restructure this paradigm
by breaking the stigma, only apparently immutable,
of centrality and of central counterparties (CCPs) [15,
1]. Decentralized Financial Market Infrastructures
(dFMI) [1]: are consortium entities whose members
are comprised of the main participants in a market,
organized in a peer-to-peer model, which is governed
by dFMI participants themselves rather than a central
intermediary. [...] dFMIs can fuse together the
advantages of a decentralised market structure with the
functions of CCPs, such that the public confidence in
CCP capabilities can be met with the right alignment of
interests. Investors dependent on the proper discharge
of CCP functions would ultimately assume a level of
risk that more accurately accords to their level of risk
aversion.
For instance, in some applications smart contracts
can take on a role similar to that previously played
CCPs, e.g. acting as a margin calculating agent
and taking on the task of transferring collateral.
Although in a different way, the smart contract
can be used to resolve disputes in the event of
non-compliance with payment [16]. Alternatively,
smart contracts can support the central counterparty,
which can maintain the business model by leveraging
the blockchain to calculate and update collateral as
well as manage funds, thus relying on financial
cryptography. A concrete application of DLTs for the
trading of securities by fund managers is Lianjiaorong,
a blockchain AssetBacked securitization platform, built
by the Bank of Communications in China [17]. The
blockchain is maintained by original stock holders,
trust companies, investors, rating agencies, accountants,
lawyers, regulators and it links funds and assets on the
ledger, realizing the credit penetration of the securities
business system.
Currently, a new infrastructure is taking hold that
is not completely tied to traditional finance, but is
entirely built using DLTs. Decentralized finance (DeFi)
is a novel P2P financial infrastructure, based on smart
contracts, that provides non-custodial, permissionless,
openly verifiable and composable operations [3].
With DeFi protocols such as Decentralized Exchanges
(DEX), anyone can engage in non-custodial exchange
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of on-chain digital assets, e.g. tokens. It is worth
noting, in this case, that there are already some DeFi
oracles are used in practice. MakerDAO is the first and
the most popular blockchain-based protocol to launch
a major automated cryptocurrency-lending platform.
In the Maker Protocol, each collateral type has a
corresponding oracle that feeds real-time price to the
aggregator, such data is from a number of independent
feeds that consist of individuals and organizations, and
the aggregator then to calculate the median price as a
reference price that the system uses [18]. Compound is
a blockchain-based platform where the users are able to
earn interest by lending their cryptoassets, it also gathers
price from multiple sources for aggregating the median
one.
4. Formal Argumentation and
Negotiation
In previous sections, we discussed how fund
managers can directly execute securities transactions
without providing clients with information about how
and why they make investment plans and actions.
Moreover, we also know that various managers may
have different investment plans based on their research
that may conflict with each other. In this section,
we present the background knowledge that can lead to
enable fund managers to be more transparent in their
decisions and to be able to resolve conflicts through
formal argumentation and negotiation.
Formal argumentation or computational
argumentation in Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a
formalism for representing and reasoning with
incomplete and inconsistent information. A wide
variety of reasoning and dialogical activities can be
captured by argumentation models in a formal and
still quite intuitive way, allowing the integration of
different concrete techniques and the development of
applications that humans can trust. Dung’s work in 1995
illustrates an argumentation system consisting of a set of
arguments and the relation (attacks) between them [19].
Formal argumentation also can be used for modeling the
dynamic interactions among agents which is particularly
at stake in a multi-agent context: the system evolves
as the agents put forward new arguments or retract
arguments and relations [20]. There are variants of
Dung’s original framework, extending the theory with
preference [21], support [22, 23], etc. In this section we
use agent abstract argumentation which is introduced in
one of the authors’ latest work [24], and autonomous
negotiation for dealing with conflicting information
raised by agents.
4.1. Agent Argumentation
We first generalize argumentation frameworks
studied by Dung [25].
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework) An
argumentation framework (AF) is a pair 〈A ,→〉
where A is a set called arguments, and→⊆A ×A is
a binary relation over A called attack.
Dung’s admissibility-based semantics is based on
the concept of defense. A set of arguments defends
another argument if they attack all its attackers.
Definition 2 (Admissibility) Let 〈A ,→〉 be an AF.
E ⊆A is conflict-free iff there are no arguments a and
b in E such that a attacks b. E ⊆ A defends c iff for
all arguments b attacking c, there is an argument a in
E such that a attacks b. E ⊆ A is admissible iff it is
conflict-free and defends all its elements.
Baroni and Giacomin then define semantics as a
function from argumentation frameworks to sets of
subsets of arguments [26].
Definition 3 (Dung semantics) A Dung semantics is
a function σ that associates with an argumentation
framework AF = 〈A ,→〉, a set of subsets of A , the
elements of σ(AF) are called extensions.
Dung distinguishes several definitions of extension.
Definition 4 (Extensions) Let 〈A ,→〉 be an AF. E ⊆
A is a complete extension iff it is admissible
and it contains all arguments it defends, i.e., E =
{a|E defends a}. E ⊆ A is a grounded extension iff
it is the smallest (for set inclusion) complete extension.
E ⊆ A is a preferred extension iff it is a largest
(for set inclusion) complete extension. E ⊆ A is a
stable extension iff it is conflict-free and it attacks each
argument which does not belong to E.
An agent argumentation framework extends an
argumentation framework with a set of agents and a
relation associating arguments with agents [23]. Note
that an argument can belong to one agent or multiple
agents.
Definition 5 (Agent argumentation framework) An
agent argumentation framework (AAF) is a 4-tuple
〈A ,→,S ,@〉 where A is a set of arguments,
→⊆ A ×A is a binary relation over A called attack,
S is a set of agents or sources, @⊆ A ×S is a
binary relation associating arguments with agents.
Aα = {a ∈ A |a @ α} for all arguments that belong
to agent α , Sa = {α|a @ α} for all agents that have
argument a.
For fund management, we use social semantics,
which is based on a reduction to preference-based
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argumentation by for each argument counting the
number of agents that have the argument [21]. It thus
interprets agent argumentation as a kind of voting, as
studied in social choice theory or judgment aggregation,
this is also the most closed to fund management.
We first give the definition of a preference-based
argumentation framework [21].
Definition 6 (Preference-based AF) A
preference-based argumentation framework (PAF)
is a 3-tuple 〈A ,→,〉 where A is a set of arguments,
→⊆ A ×A is a binary attack relation,  is a partial
order (irreflexive and transitive) over A , called
preference relation.
There are different reductions of preference have
been introduced [27, 28]. We refer to those papers for
an explanation and motivation, and we choose one of
the reductions in our use case below which satisfies the
essential conflict-free principle analyzed in [23].
Definition 7 (Reductions of PAF to AF (PR)) Given
an PAF = 〈A ,→,〉: PR(PAF)=〈A ,→′〉, where
→′ = {a→′ b|a→ b,b  a, or b→ a, not a→ b,a 
b, or a→ b, not b→ a}.
In social agent semantics, an argument is preferred
to another argument if it belongs to more agents. The
reduction from AAF to PAF is used as an intermediary
step for social agent semantics.
Definition 8 (Social Reductions of AAF to PAF (SAP))
Given an AAF = 〈A ,→,S ,@〉, SAP(AAF) = 〈A ,→
,〉 with = {a b||Sa|> |Sb|}.
Definition 9 (Social Reductions of AAF to AF (SR))
Given an AAF = 〈A ,→,S ,@〉, SRi(AAF) =
PRi(SAP(AAF)), PRi is one of the four
reductions of PAF to AF, where the semantics
δ (AAF) = σ(SRi(AAF)) = σ(PRi(SAP(AAF)))
for i ∈ {1,2,3,4}.
4.2. Autonomous Agents and Negotiation
A software agent is a software that acts on behalf
of another actor (often a human user) to perform a task
or achieve a given goal [29]. Agents are designed to
be bound to individual perspectives [30]. This makes
agents good candidates to represent the subjectivity
and nuances of different expert opinions. Multi-agent
systems [31] provide a distributed platform capable of
implementing intelligence in decentralized ecosystems
such as DLT-based systems where agents are capable,
using well-established conflict-resolution mechanisms
(e.g. negotiation), of helping the different stakeholders
finding agreements that satisfy their often conflicting
interests.
In his influential book, Dean Pruitt provides one of
negotiation’s most widely accepted definitions [32]: the
process by which a joint decision is made by two or
more parties. The parties first verbalize contradictory
demands and then move towards agreement by a process
of concession making or search for new alternatives.
The problem being negotiated, or the topic under
discussion (e.g. car purchase) can be usually divided
into issues (also called attributes). Some negotiations
involve only single issue (e.g. car price) whereas others
involve multiple issues (e.g. price and delivery time).
Negotiators may not only disagree on the value assigned
to each issue, the priority given to each issue can differ
from one negotiator to another and hence this can be a
source of both divergence and convergence.
Automated negotiation is one taking place among
autonomous agents [33]. Autonomous negotiation has
a protocol. The latter is the set of rules that governs the
interactions during a negotiation session (also called a
thread). Whereas the negotiation protocol defines what
is the set of possible actions that can be taken during
a negotiation session, an agent has a decision model
[34, 35] that allows the agent to (i) evaluate the value
of an offer received from the opponent (e.g., using a
utility function), (ii) decide whether it is acceptable (also
called acceptance condition [36]), and (iii) determine
what to do next (known as the negotiation strategy
[34]). Automated negotiation has been applied to
solve conflicts and reach agreements in several domains
including cloud and service provisioning [37], smart
grid and power distribution [38], and trading and stock
market [39].
Figure 2. Negotiation Sequence to Decide The




In this section, we present how our solution, IHiBO,
a framework based on the use of the blockchain
and smart contracts can be leveraged to provide the
features of treceability and transparency. IHiBO
can deal with the potentially inconsistent information
input by human experts: we explain how the oracle
can manage the information by argumentation and
negotiation considering three different architectures.
5.1. Conflict Resolution
As described in Section 2, the process of portfolio
management fits well with argumentation theory in
AI. The decision can be seen as being based on
arguments and counter-arguments. Argumentation, as
the result, can be useful for deriving decisions and
explaining a choice already made. Managers provide
their arguments from their own research to identify
promising stocks with different level of accuracy and
thereby make different portfolio choices which are likely
to be incomplete and inconsistent.
The fictitious simple example (the real life cases
would be much more complex) is as follows. Manager
α holds the arguments a: To buy the stocks, since
the company just donated to charities that is beneficial
to good commercial reputation, while another two
managers β and γ at the same time are against buy the
stocks, they hold the same arguments b and c, b is To
sell the stocks, since there is evidence that the leader is
under accusations of charity fraud, and c is To sell the
stocks, since the company has poor sales performance.
Based on the above, we can build an agent
argumentation framework on the left up side of Fig.2,
AAF = 〈A ,→,S ,@〉 where A = {a,b,c}, →=
{(a,b),(b,a),(a,c),(c,a)}, S = {α,β ,γ}, @= {(a,α),
(b,β ), (b,γ),(c,β ),(c,γ)}. Since |Sb| > |Sa| and
|Sc|> |Sa|, b a and c a, we get the corresponding
PAF, and giving the reduction from PAF to AF, we
have the only AF on the downside of Fig.2. Then we
can calculate the only acceptable set {b,c}, which is
grounded, preferred and stable extension. The set tells
the final decision is to sell the stocks. One thing needs
to be noticed: argumentation does not always provide
a definite outcome. Depending on the decision making
process, different protocols can be specified in advance
for such cases: e.g. to roll back or to assign weights
to the arguments and the relation among them (so that
these cannot be always equal).
After deciding to sell the stocks, the next problem is









Figure 3. Social reduction
the computational automated negotiation comes into
play. To illustrate how it works, we give an example of
the negotiation sequence based on the on the quantities
of stocks to sell. The negotiation process is based
on the alternating offer protocol [40]. Agents can bid
new offers to the opponent (O f f er() function). When
receiving an offer, and agent can accept it using accept()
function or reject it and propose a counter-offer (with
the CounterO f f er() function). In the example, we have
a manager A, i.e., agent A, and manager B, i.e., agent
B. Agent A proposes to sell 1000 stocks at the price of
151$, while agent B counteroffers to sell 1200 stocks at
the price of 145$, then agent A proposes to sell 1150
stocks at the price of 148$. The final offer given by A is
accepted by both parties which means they come to an
agreement.
5.2. Blockchain Framework
Although formal argumentation has the ability to
provide various ways for explaining why a claim or a
decision is made, it lacks of the features of auditability,
traceability and transparency. In order to gain these
features, we propose to integrate formal argumentation
with a blockchain and smart contracts framework,
which provides a favourable environment with its salient
properties. In recent years, the interest in the blockchain
and in smart contracts has been growing, as more and
more different kind of systems rely on their use to
transfer digital assets in a “trustless” way [41].
The main principle here is the fact that the
immutability property of DLTs enables a favourable
environment for storing information that can be later
audited. We assume that the outcome of the negotiation,
i.e. the decision, is given in input to a smart contract
that will enact an action, e.g. security transaction, buy
a stock in the fund management use case. We refer to
this smart contract as the TransactionSC, and can be the
implementation of any of the use cases shown in Section
3.
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Figure 4. IHiBO with three architectures
Based on the above consideration, we compare
three different architectures that can take form in our
blockchain framework (Figure 4):
1. Centralized Oracle - The first architecture we
consider is the simplest one, where argumentation
and negotiation phases do not involve any
blockchain process, neither a smart contract
execution. These are executed in a “centralized”
environment, e.g. a web platform or a company
application, and then the decision will be given in
input to the TransactionSC by a specific service in
this environment, providing the role of an oracle.
2. Smart Contract Argumentation and
Negotiation - In the second architecture,
argumentation and negotiation are directly
implemented as smart contracts, and thus are
executed following the blockchain protocol. It
means that the human experts, through their agent
software, directly interact with the blockchain
for giving in input the data for constructing the
argumentation graph and then for enacting the
negotiation functions that are expressed as smart
contract instructions.
3. Decentralized Oracle - Finally, the third
architecture we consider consists of a network
of agents that execute a distributed software
independently of the blockchain protocol and
that limit the execution of the smart contract
instructions to only a few steps, necessary to be
trustworthy. The implementation of such network
consists in the so called “layer two” solution
[42], where the same principle of decentralization
of DLTs is applied. Indeed, an instance of
such layer two solution would be another DLTs
with different features in respect to the “main”
one [43] where to write the negotiation outcome,
e.g. consensus mechanism, or faster operations
execution.
We take as reference Table 1 for comparing the
three architectures. The first discriminator for choosing
one architecture over another consists in where the
argumentation graph (and all the data needed to the
execution) is stored. Such data is needed for the
execution of the argumentation and negotiation process,
hence is constantly updated. This information is
needed to be stored on the ledger only in the case
of the second architecture. The drawbacks of storing
large quantities of data on-chain are many, above all,
the elevated transaction fee cost [11] and the almost
impractical upload latency [44]. Furthermore, the
fact that instruction execution would be unfavourable
compared to the other two, again in terms of fees and
latency between operations, should also be taken into
account for Architecture 2. However, the advantage
of this architecture is that the negotiation execution
would be completely traced and verifiable, since the
execution would be completely carried out through
the smart contracts in the blockchain. On the
other hand, the complete execution of the conflict
resolution would be poorly verifiable using a classic
centralized oracle (Architecture 1), because on the
blockchain only the results would be stored. It
would also be highly susceptible to single point
of failures. A good compromise between the two
architectures would be the use of a decentralized oracle,
Architecture 3, for executing argumentation, negotiation
and TransactionSC interaction. The data needed for
carrying out these processes, such as the argumentation
graph, would be stored in a secondary DLT with
cheaper costs or in another layer two technology that
preserves data immutability. The negotiation execution
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Graph On-chain No Yes No
Negotiation
Execution Tracing Poor Very Good Good
Verifiability Poor Very Good Very Good
Single Point of
Failure Yes No No
Execution Overhead
Costs (Latency, Fees) Very Good Poor Good
can happen on off-chain and then be “committed” [42]
on the main chain using an hash function in order to be
verifiable. It would not be susceptible to single point
of failure and the execution overhead cost would be
favourable in respect to the second architecture.
Next to the technical and financial aspects, legal
considerations should also be taken into account
when comparing the different architectures. While
our motivation is to provide transparency regarding
the decision-making process to the principal to gain
some insights whether the work of the fiduciary
indeed happens according to his best interest, the
transparency one should gain with using DLTs is
subject to serious limitations. On one hand, the the
principal’s right to check is not limitless, it concerns
strictly the processes of managing his assets, but more
importantly, given the characteristics of DLTs, a(n
unwantedly) broader audience would be involved in
the disclosure of information if one chose not the
appropriate architecture, threatening trade secrets and
involving privacy problems. Architecture 3 seems to be
the best option from this point of view too: in contrast
to the public, permissionless verification that DLTs
usually employ while smart contracts are executed,
layer two solutions usually move this process off-chain.
This definitely poses security issues compared to a
protocol executed completely on-chain, however there
are currently some viable solutions proposed that
address this issue [1]. For instance, an application
might be the use of a permissioned sidechain. In this
case, information that would clash with trade secrets
and privacy would be stored on that permissioned
chain and maintained by the participants who have
been nominated for this, e.g. joint data controllers as
permissioned blockchain operators [45]. Through the
use of commitments on the main chain [42], i.e., the
permissionless one, the necessary steps for verification
are implemented, and once the fiduciaries operating
the sidechain reveal part of the information to the
principals, the latter can verify its validity on-chain [43].
On the other hand, once the application of DLTs
become widespread in the securities market, mandatory
disclosure rules motivated by anti-tax avoidance should
be aligned with the new technology [2].
5.3. Trust and Transparency
The IHiBO we proposed might have particular
relevance in cases where the decision making process
about what data should be fed in the smart contract
needs to be transparent: for fund management, the
investors don’t know what exactly happens to their
money, and especially why, so the question whether
the fund managers do fulfill their legal and ethical
commitment of acting in the best interest of the investor
might remain unanswered.
In general, the transparency that can be gained due
to the proposed intelligent oracle architecture could be
highly valuable in any trust services. The concept
of the fiduciary is based on—as the name of these
services show—trust: it requires being bound both
legally and ethically to operate and use its expertise in
the investor’s best interests on the fiduciary’s side, and
it requires trust on the investor’s side to believe in that
the fiduciary has done and will do so. This trust can
be, to some extent, replaced by intelligent, decentralized
solutions providing full transparency of, for instance,
fund management: not only the transactions can be fully
traced but the expert opinion input and the decision
mechanism too. By implementing argumentation and
negotiation phases through oracles into smart contract
or make them on a side-chain can generate more
transparency for investors: investors can know how the
final decision is made at the end of reasoning. This
could be highly relevant for the investor practicing his
right to check the fiduciary’s activities in the case of
an asset management contract. From Explainable AI
perspective, Architecture 2 and Architecture 3 offer an
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explanation to how a specific decisions has been made.
We argue that a layer two solution, the decentralized
oracle solution in Architecture 3, provides the proper
mid ground in terms of cost of execution, for latency
and fees, and verifiability of the complete process.
Indeed, there might be use cases where some data
should not be disclosed, and an argumentation and
negotiation architecture based on a full execution on
smart contracts would not allow it. In the other extreme
case, for a centralized oracle, the entire process behind
a decision made could be concealed or its log could
be altered. In a decentralized oracle architecture the
complete execution could be logged off-chain and then
committed on-chain, making it impossible to alter the
logs, while not disclosing these entirely [42].
Members of the management body4 shall have
adequate access to information and documents which
are needed to oversee and monitor management
decision-making5. In our second and third architectures,
each execution of all the smart contracts can be audited,
validated and maintained by every participants, thus
reduce the time and fee of extra work of surveillance,
which will in turn reduce potential corruption or
conflicts of interests.
6. Conclusion and Future Perspectives
The main contribution of this paper is proposing
an integrated framework which incorporates formal
argumentation and negotiation within a blockchain
environment for making the decision-making processes
of fund management transparent and traceable. There is
a very broad literature devoted on the notions of trust. In
this paper, we do not engage with a unique trust because
of its multifaceted and complex nature. However,
from an interpersonal perspective, trust inevitably comes
along with a certain degree of risk and vulnerability
[46], the more familiar users are with the technology,
the more willing they are to take the risks. Especially
in the case of information and power asymmetries, the
fund managers have the ability to act against the interests
of the principals. What our proposal can enhance is the
transparency and reliability of some business processes
which is expected to raise the willingness of entering to
these business relations on the principal side.
Our motivation came from trust services, so we
4Art. 4(8) MiFID II: ’management body’ means the body or
bodies of an investment firm, market operator or data reporting
services provider, which are appointed in accordance with national
law, which oversee and monitor management decision-making and
include persons who effectively direct the business of the entity.
5DIRECTIVE 2014/65/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive
2011/61/EU
explained our idea in a fund management scenario, but
our proposal is not bound to this domain. Also, the
research on oracles is still in its infant stage, there
are multiple pressing questions and challenges for the
future. A possible work could be to investigate on the
integration of consensus mechanisms for a layer two
solution to the dispute resolution phase, in order to
narrow the gap between blockchain and argumentation
as well as negotiation, since there is no specialized
blockchain yet that has a protocol that integrates
reasoning. For instance if there is a blockchain based
on Proof of Stake (instead of Proof of Work), validators
need to vote to validate a transaction based on a
reasoning process where each validator has a different
set of knowledge data. Lastly, another follow up
work is to explore the more advanced argumentation
theory. For instance, probabilistic argumentation
captures the quantitative aspects of uncertainties by
underlying probabilistic logic which makes it possibly
more suitable for picture the financial reasoning.
References
[1] S. Feenan, D. Heller, A. Lipton, M. Morini, R. Ram,
R. Sams, T. Swanson, S. Yong, and D. B. Zalles,
“Decentralized financial market infrastructures,” The
Journal of FinTech, Forthcoming, 2020.
[2] M. Thuvarakan, “Regulatory changes for redesigned
securities markets with distributed ledger technology,”
The Knowledge Engineering Review, vol. 35, 2020.
[3] S. M. Werner, D. Perez, L. Gudgeon, A. Klages-Mundt,
D. Harz, and W. J. Knottenbelt, “Sok: Decentralized
finance (defi),” arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.08778, 2021.
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